Search Results for institutional-investor-activism

This book analyses the impact of activists on the companies that they invest, the effects on shareholders and on activists funds themselves.

Author: William Bratton

Publisher: Oxford University Press

ISBN: 9780198723936

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 640

View: 609

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The past two decades has witnessed unprecedented changes in the corporate governance landscape in Europe, the US and Asia. Across many countries, activist investors have pursued engagements with management of target companies. More recently, the role of the hostile activist shareholder has been taken up by a set of hedge funds. Hedge fund activism is characterized by mergers and corporate restructuring, replacement of management and board members, proxy voting, and lobbying of management. These investors target and research companies, take large positions in `their stock, criticize their business plans and governance practices, and confront their managers, demanding action enhancing shareholder value. This book analyses the impact of activists on the companies that they invest, the effects on shareholders and on activists funds themselves. Chapters examine such topic as investors' strategic approaches, the financial returns they produce, and the regulatory frameworks within which they operate. The chapters also provide historical context, both of activist investment and institutional shareholder passivity. The volume facilitates a comparison between the US and the EU, juxtaposing not only regulatory patterns but investment styles.
2015-01-15 By William Bratton

Author:

Publisher:

ISBN: OCLC:864775730

Category:

Page: 279

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2008 By

118 Karpoff , Malatesta , and Walking , Corporate Governance and Shareholder
Initiatives : Empirical Evidence . Daily , Johnson , Ellstrand , and Dalton ,
Institutional Investor Activism : Follow the Leaders ? But see Del Guercio and
Hawkins ...

Author: Michael J. Rubach

Publisher: Taylor & Francis

ISBN: 0815335024

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 182

View: 988

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This book examines the shareholder activism of institutional investors, and the effect of this activism on portfolio performance. By focusing on 118 institutional investors headquartered in the United States, the book is unique in addressing the shareholder activism of a large sample. Institutional shareholder activism is defined to include both traditional mechanisms of influence (i.e. filing shareholder proposals) and relationship investing. Institutional owners included private and public pension funds, mutual funds, bank trusts, insurance companies, endowments, and foundations. These institutional owners differ substantially, and these differences lead institutions to use their ownership power to pursue different philosophies and actions. Some institutions follow a passive governance policy, While others adopt an activist role. This book seeks to answer four questions: (1) Are institutional owners actively involved in the strategic affairs of companies in their portfolios? (2)Which formsof activism do institutional owners employ (either confrontational mechanisms, such as filing shareholder proposals, or relationship building mechanisms)? (3)Which forms of activism employed are most effective? and (4) Does the institutional type affect its pursuit of shareholder activism? In answering these questions the author suggests new important results that in many cases are contrary to what prior reports of the activities by a small number of institutional owners may intimate."

tors' incentive to engage in shareholder activism. Focuses are on whether
institutional investors have capacity and motivation, either real or potential.
Chapter 6 focuses on capacity while Chap. 7 explores motivation. Part V provides
empirical ...

Author: Wenge Wang

Publisher: Springer Nature

ISBN: 9783030195779

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 253

View: 539

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Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, this book examines whether qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs), through their shareholder activism, have a meaningful positive impact on the corporate governance of firms listed on the mainland Chinese stock market. Capital flows into and out of China are still subject to tight controls, and the QFII scheme is one important avenue through which QFIIs can become invested in the Chinese stock market. This book is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in learning about ways to invest in one of the world’s largest economies. Wang discusses in depth what specific opportunities, challenges and restrictions to expect in the process, and how investing in China differs from investing in countries with a more open capital account.
2019-11-22 By Wenge Wang

Author:

Publisher:

ISBN: OCLC:1072757493

Category:

Page: 98

View: 808

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1996 By

In Germany, assets under management of professional investors have increased at 92 percent from 1990 to 2001.1 In addition, a growing administration of private savings by professional fund managers as well as the intensified exercise of ...

Author: Sebastian Sturm

Publisher: GRIN Verlag

ISBN: 9783640311644

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 114

View: 971

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Diploma Thesis from the year 2008 in the subject Business economics - Law, grade: 1,3, Technical University of Chemnitz, language: English, abstract: Corporate management and corporate governance are becoming more and more crucial in today’s successful economies. With the increasing relevance of capital markets this subject comes more into the focus of the public. Particularly, the fast growing importance of institutional investors is a key factor which helps to explain the changing attitude of managers towards shareholders and corporate governance. In conjunction with the German capital market, a wide variety of mismanagement in German public limited companies has revealed shortfalls of German top-management and corporate control in the last decade. This development was of fundamental importance for the development of the German Corporate Governance Code. Hence, the basic underlying of corporate governance can be attributed to a conflict between the management of a listed corporation and its owners. More precisely, this conflict arises because the management does not adequately comprise the interests of shareholders. In Germany, assets under management of professional investors have increased at 92 percent from 1990 to 2001.1 In addition, a growing administration of private savings by professional fund managers as well as the intensified exercise of influence by institutional investors on corporate governance and corporate management respectively corporate strategy is observable. Similarly, a growing importance of institutional investors could be observed in the United Kingdom as well as in the United States. Within academic literature, the issue of activism by institutional investors in Germany is analyzed little, so far. Furthermore, there are only a few surveys on the outcome of the influence by institutional investors on corporate management. Therefore, this thesis aims to answer the following questions: 1. How was the development of shareholder activism in Germany and how can it be characterized and explained? 2. Is shareholder activism a superior tool in relation to the market of corporate control to solve the principal-agent problem? 3. What do institutional investors demand from German corporations and in particular from corporate management? 4. Which options do institutional investors have to influence corporate management? 5. How are these options for activism covered by the German Corporate Governance Code and the German legal framework? 6. What is the optimum corporate governance from an institutional investor’s angle? 7. What is the empirical outcome?
2009-04-14 By Sebastian Sturm

Over recent decades, a notable change in equity ownership in UK listed
companies is the growth of institutional shareholdings. Share ownership has
moved away from individual investors to become concentrated in the hands of a
relatively ...

Author: Bo Gong

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 9781136015762

Category: Law

Page: 300

View: 743

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Institutional shareholder participation has long been considered as vital to good corporate governance yet its potential does not seem to have been realized. The recent banking crisis exposed the passivity of some institutional shareholders, many of whom appear to have chosen to sell their stakes in the banks rather than intervene or challenge the board when they realized the strategies followed by the banks were excessively risky. Institutional shareholders’ role to scrutinize and monitor the decisions of boards and executive management in the banking sector in the UK is considered by many to be a failure, resulting in the phenomenon of ‘ownerless corporations’, as described by Lord Myners. In China, despite the fast rising of institutional investment in the securities market, institutional shareholders have not yet played a contributory role in monitoring corporate managers in listed companies. Drawing on empirical evidence this book seeks to systematically analyses institutional shareholders’ incentives to activism to explain when and why shareholder activism will occur. The book puts forward a model which explains the factors that determine institutional shareholders’ propensity for activism. The model both elaborates the collective benefits of activism as a means of achieving managerial accountability asks whether and when shareholder activism is rational for any individual shareholder. The book then goes to on to apply these finding to both the UK and China in order to explain the varying levels of shareholder activism in each jurisdiction. The book is the first to take an in-depth look at institutional share-holder activism in China providing prescriptions to promote greater shareholder engagement and exploring the potential it holds for improving corporate governance in the region.
2013-12-13 By Bo Gong

Extant literature, from a shareholder activism perspective, considers these metrics on a standalone basis, relegating each topic to one of the two groups of hedge funds and other institutional investors.

Author: Andrea Fassi

Publisher:

ISBN: OCLC:1137084048

Category:

Page:

View: 722

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This paper investigates the relationship between shareholder activism and corporate governance, financial returns and sustainability for U.S. based companies. Extant literature, from a shareholder activism perspective, considers these metrics on a standalone basis, relegating each topic to one of the two groups of hedge funds and other institutional investors. Our key findings indicate that hedge funds, who are deemed to focus on financial returns, have a positive impact similar to the one observed for other institutional investors on corporate governance. Moreover, we do not find evidence that hedge fund ownership results in abnormal financial returns in the respective companies compared to companies owned by other institutional investors. Finally, we show that hedge fund majority-owned companies are surprisingly much more likely to engage in sustainability reporting compared to their counterparts. These results help re-think the role of shareholder activism and assumptions held on different institutional investor groups.
2019 By Andrea Fassi

Gillian and Starks (2000) observed an increase in the number of votes cast in
favor of shareholder proposals. Whereas proposals sponsored by institutions or
through coordinated activism receive significantly more favorable votes than
those ...

Author: Christian Wilk

Publisher: GRIN Verlag

ISBN: 9783640946754

Category:

Page: 80

View: 497

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Bachelor Thesis from the year 2010 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 9.0, Maastricht University, language: English, abstract: This thesis analyzes the voting behavior of the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association - College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF). As one of the largest financial services companies in the United States, with over 426 billion Dollar in combined assets under management as of 31 of March 2010, the fund is using proxy voting as a tool to promote positive returns from their investments. This thesis relies on a database constructed out of SEC N-PX lings over a period of six month. The results indicate that TIAA-CREF only withholds directors their vote in a moderate amount of cases. In addition, the fund voted more often against management at proposals cast by shareholders concerning board structures and shareholder rights than at proposals concerning other corporate governance issues.
2011-07 By Christian Wilk

Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors in Germany – Status Quo The
objective of this chapter is to outline the historical development of investor
activism in Germany. Hence, it is necessary to present evidence on a growing
institutional ...

Author: Sebastian Sturm

Publisher: GRIN Verlag

ISBN: 9783640310449

Category:

Page: 122

View: 730

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Diploma Thesis from the year 2008 in the subject Business economics - Law, grade: 1,3, Technical University of Chemnitz, language: English, abstract: Corporate management and corporate governance are becoming more and more crucial in today's successful economies. With the increasing relevance of capital markets this subject comes more into the focus of the public. Particularly, the fast growing importance of institutional investors is a key factor which helps to explain the changing attitude of managers towards shareholders and corporate governance. In conjunction with the German capital market, a wide variety of mismanagement in German public limited companies has revealed shortfalls of German top-management and corporate control in the last decade. This development was of fundamental importance for the development of the German Corporate Governance Code. Hence, the basic underlying of corporate governance can be attributed to a conflict between the management of a listed corporation and its owners. More precisely, this conflict arises because the management does not adequately comprise the interests of shareholders. In Germany, assets under management of professional investors have increased at 92 percent from 1990 to 2001.1 In addition, a growing administration of private savings by professional fund managers as well as the intensified exercise of influence by institutional investors on corporate governance and corporate management respectively corporate strategy is observable. Similarly, a growing importance of institutional investors could be observed in the United Kingdom as well as in the United States. Within academic literature, the issue of activism by institutional investors in Germany is analyzed little, so far. Furthermore, there are only a few surveys on the outcome of the influence by institutional investors on corporate management. Therefore, this thesis aims to answer the following questions: 1. How was the development of shareholder activism in Ger
2009-05 By Sebastian Sturm

Financial Institutions, Corporations, Investors, and Activists H. Kent Baker, John R
. Nofsinger ... While much has been written about institutional investor activism in
the corporate governance arena, much less is known about their advocacy ...

Author: H. Kent Baker

Publisher: John Wiley & Sons

ISBN: 9781118237014

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 528

View: 396

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A detailed look at the role of social responsibility in finance and investing The concept of socially responsible finance and investing continues to grow, especially in the wake of one of the most devastating financial crises in history. This includes responsibility from the corporate side (corporate social responsibility) as well as the investor side (socially responsible investing) of the capital markets. Filled with in-depth insights and practical advice, Socially Responsible Finance and Investing offers an important basis of knowledge regarding both the theory and practice of this ever-evolving area of finance. As part of the Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance, this book showcases contributed chapters from professionals and academics with extensive expertise on this particular subject. It provides a comprehensive view of socially responsible foundations and their applications to finance and investing as determined by the current state of research. Discusses many important issues associated with socially responsible finance and investing, like moral hazard and the concept of "too big to fail" Contains contributed chapters from numerous thought-leaders in the field of finance Presents comprehensive coverage starting with the basics and bringing you through to cutting-edge, current theory and practice Now more than ever, we need to be mindful of the social responsibilities of all investment practices. The recent financial crisis and recession has changed the financial landscape for years to come and Socially Responsible Finance and Investing is a timely guide to help us navigate this difficult terrain.
2012-08-31 By H. Kent Baker

Shareholder Activism Handbook is the single most comprehensive guide on all matters relating to enforcing shareholders' rights.

Author: Jay W. Eisenhofer

Publisher: Aspen Publishers

ISBN: 9780735557000

Category: Reference

Page: 1110

View: 964

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Shareholder Activism Handbook is the single most comprehensive guide on all matters relating to enforcing shareholders' rights. As shareholder activism becomes a more integral part of investing, the law continues to respond accordingly. Legislators and the courts have established new guidelines for, and limits to, shareholders' efforts in this regard. Although various publications or articles have addressed certain aspects of shareholder activism, such as proxy fights and securities litigation, few publications have attempted to assimilate the relevant information into a single resource. And no publication presents this information from the perspective of the shareholder. Until now!. Logically organized into six essential parts, Shareholder Activism Handbook delivers everything you need to represent the rights of shareholders as they attempt to influence corporate direction. Only Shareholder Activism HandbookProvides background on issues relating to shareholder activism, including the balance of power between shareholders and managementDescribes how shareholders may exercise their rights as shareholdersExplains when and how shareholders may challenge mergers and other 'change in control' eventsSets forth the activist investor's role in corporate litigationExplains the role of the 'lead plaintiff' in securities litigationAddresses the unique rights of bondholdersOnly Shareholder Activism Handbook presents the issues that are most important to shareholder activists in a single, comprehensive source.
2005-01-01 By Jay W. Eisenhofer

Author: Stephen Graeme Bowden

Publisher:

ISBN: 0909013071

Category: Corporate governance

Page: 68

View: 241

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Author:

Publisher:

ISBN: OCLC:246890922

Category: Corporate governance

Page: 64

View: 216

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2005 By

Author: Giovanni Marseguerra

Publisher:

ISBN: OCLC:878005001

Category:

Page: 42

View: 978

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In order to illuminate the extent to which the growing trend of shareholder activism calls for a new understanding of the kind of shareholder-corporate relations the law should facilitate, this book introduces the concept of shareholder ...

Author: Anita Anand

Publisher: Oxford University Press

ISBN: 9780190096557

Category: Law

Page: 336

View: 556

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How effectively can governing mechanisms forged before the surge of activist investment continue to protect shareholders and efficiently order capital markets? This is a pressing question for scholars and practitioners of corporate law, as well as for market participants generally. In order to illuminate the extent to which the growing trend of shareholder activism calls for a new understanding of the kind of shareholder-corporate relations the law should facilitate, this book introduces the concept of shareholder-driven corporate governance. This concept refers to the evident phenomenon of shareholder involvement in corporate governance and offers a normative endorsement of this development. In order to secure the benefits of investors' increasing involvement in corporate affairs, regulatory regimes must grapple with a number of considerations. This book is based on the idea that shareholder corporate governance is a welcome development, but that it does not come without regulatory challenges. For one, it requires rejecting the idea that well-ordered capital markets can be achieved through corporate law which is subservient to private ordering. The mandatory character of, for example, securities regulation is vital to fostering shareholder involvement in corporate affairs. Defenders of shareholder corporate governance must also confront the matter of "wolf packs," or loosely formed bands of investors who defy existing regulatory categories but nonetheless exert collective influence. Regulation that is sensitive to both the inadequacies of past approaches to corporate-shareholder relations and the novel challenges posed by increasing shareholder activism will be able to harness activism, allowing capital markets to flourish.
2020-02-01 By Anita Anand

One argument for this reluctance is a fear that the activism could result in
retaliation . Because of business relations with the corporation , pressure -
sensitive institutional investors may be compelled to vote with the management
even if ...

Author: Stuart L. Gillan

Publisher:

ISBN: UCSD:31822031513617

Category: Corporate governance

Page: 24

View: 348

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This study examines the effect of the presence of "activist" institutional investors on firm performance.

Author: David L. Kang

Publisher:

ISBN: OCLC:44646861

Category:

Page: 20

View: 919

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This study examines the effect of the presence of "activist" institutional investors on firm performance. I analyze the U.S. Fortune 500, 1982-1994, using a proprietary database of activism ratings of institutional investors compiled by the largest U.S. proxy solicitation firm. Pooled, cross-sectional time series models indicate that the presence of an activist investment company institutional investor as the single largest shareholder is negatively associated with unrelated diversification, and positively associated with performance. These results suggest that the credible threat of voice causes certain activist institutional investors to serve and important monitoring role in corporate governance.
2000 By David L. Kang

There are other reasons for the rise of shareholder activism in the United States .
Many of the largest institutions are public pension funds , and some of these are
managed by officials with political aspirations which may be furthered by well ...

Author: Arnold W. Sametz

Publisher: Irwin Professional Pub

ISBN: UOM:49015001336206

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 559

View: 882

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